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Introduction
In this paper we study how the resolution of an important economic problem ensuring high environmental quality plays a role in how citizens perceive the quality and performance of the political system in which they live in. There is a lot of public discussion about the importance of environmental issues, and it is evident that there is a greater popular awareness for environmental problems today than some decades ago (Kirchgässner & Schneider 2003; Tanguay et al. 2004) . What is less known, however, is: Just how important is the environment to individuals' perceptions of the performance of their governmental regimes, taking into account that individuals also want to achieve other, potentially conicting goals such as economic prosperity?
Answering this question is critical because most environmental policies are costly. Therefore, their ultimate acceptance will hinge on the economic value the public assigns to such policies.
Even though most individuals recognize the collective benets of treating the environment carefully, individual considerations are likely to undermine against such actions. In economic terms, the environment is a classic case of a public good, for which a collective action problem in the sense of Olson (1965) arises: The marginal collective benets of adopting careful actions, vis-a-vis the environment, outweigh by far the marginal private benets (even though the latter vary across individuals). Importantly, rational individuals are aware of this wedge between what they know would be good for society, and what the optimal individual course of action is.
Thus, they know that environmental quality tends to be undersupplied. Consequently, the main hypothesis that we test is that citizens want an eective resolution of this dilemma. Because solutions to collective action problems are available only through a broad consensus on policies, the success a country has in tackling collective problems like the environment is a matter, among other things, of how well a political system works. Therefore, we operationalize the research question by asking more specically: Are citizens more satised with the way their political system works when more environmental policies are established and/or environmental quality is higher? And how much do they care about that issue, compared to other goals, such as personal or country-wide economic welfare?
To answer these questions, we choose as the primary dependent variable a direct measure of citizens' views on the performance of their respective governments. This measure is`satisfaction with democracy' (SWD), a survey measure that is available for a wide range of countries.
Satisfaction with the way democracy works is not an indicator of system legitimacy per se. Rather, it is one indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime widely used in political science. Survey measures such as life satisfaction and happiness are very popular in economic research (see, among many others, Frey & Stutzer 2000 Di Tella et al. 2003; Alesina et al. 2004; Blanchower & Oswald 2004; and Bjørnskov et al. 2007) . Because of its comparable validity and usefulness (Linde & Ekman 2003) , SWD and related measures are also increasingly being applied (see, among others, Van Praag & Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004; and Wagner et al. 2009 ). SWD does not attempt to capture whether people support the principles of democracy, but rather how they judge it to work in practice in their actual experience. It is a summary indicator (Clarke et al. 1993 ) that measures satisfaction with`the constitution in operation' (Klingemann 1999) . 1 As explanatory variables for SWD (besides standard individual and country-level economic controls) we use a broad array of environmental policy and quality variables. We compile a very large panel dataset, covering 16 countries in the time period from 1976 through 2000 (though we do not have data for every country-year combination).
We nd that environmental policy and quality matter to citizens in statistically and economically important ways. Over the whole sample period, more comprehensive environmental policy is associated with more SWD. For example, an increase in the number of environmental policy measures by one standard deviation is on average associated with a rise in SWD equivalent to an increase in GDP growth by one standard deviation. Environmental expenditures also are positively associated with SWD, while environmental taxes tend to have a negative eect.
For instance, by increasing environmental expenditures (measured as a share of GDP) by one percentage point, SWD for the average citizen is estimated to increase by about a quarter of a standard deviation. Our ndings are robust to controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and numerous time-varying controls at both the country level and the individual level.
We also present evidence, using three distinct sample splits, that some citizens (such as parents, young citizens, and those who are highly educated) tend to care more about environmental issues than others. In sum, the results suggest that citizens, or at least important subsets of them, expect the political system to implement policies that address the environmental collective action problem.
With these ndings, the paper relates to the literature on political economy, governance, and happiness. Some evidence now exists that good government (measured by broad concepts such as eectiveness, observance of the rule of law, absence of corruption, responsiveness to citizens' preferences, accountability, and political stability) is associated with greater happiness, or individual life satisfaction (Helliwell & Huang 2008) . Helliwell (2006) and Layard (2006) provide summaries of related results on the relationship between public policies and happiness. However, we do not know of any study that has considered the government's success in implementing policies addressing specic collective action problems. Perhaps closest to our study are some economics papers that have studied environmental quality (but not policy) as a determinant of happiness. One line of work has considered specic environmental amenities. For example, Van
Praag & Baarsma (2005) use the happiness approach to value airport noise. A second line of work studies broader environmental measures. Welsch (2006) presents evidence that air pollution, such as ambient nitrogen, particulates and lead, is negatively associated with subjective well-being for ten European countries (see also Welsch 2002) . Welsch (2007) expands the analysis to a cross-section of 54 countries and calculates the marginal rate of substitution of income for pollution abatement. Rehdanz & Maddison (2005) examine the relationship between climate and happiness in an empirical analysis using data on 67 countries. They nd that happiness increases with a higher mean temperature in the coldest month and decreases with higher mean temperatures in the hottest month as well as that it decreases with a more months with very little precipitation of rain. 2 so far no study has considered the implications of specic policy measures. 2 As such, the present paper and the cited studies can also be interpreted as complementary to the existing, rich literature in economics that has addressed the economic value of specic environmental amenities. See Freeman (1985) and Environmental Protection Agency (2000) for surveys. Standard methods include, on the one hand, revealed preference methods and hedonic pricing (Viscusi 1993; Bockstael et al. 1987; Rosen 1974) , including those based on recreation demand estimation (Bockstael & McConnell 1983; Morey et al. 1993) , as well as, All of these studies use either purely cross-sectional data, or, where they use panel data, they average happiness over all individuals in a country. However, this assumes homogenous policy eects, reduces the degrees of freedom substantially, and requires cardinality of the satisfaction scores, making it a less than ideal method for the question under study. One prior study that uses individual-level data is by Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Gowdy (2007) . However, their investigation of the relationship between individual happiness and attitudes towards ozone pollution and species extinction is limited to British data.
Our ndings on environmental quality are broadly consistent with these studies. However, our results add to the existing literature in four important ways. First, this is the rst study, to the best of our knowledge, to consider SWD as a measure of how much individuals care about the environment. Because environmental problems are by their nature collective problems, understanding variations in perceptions of the quality of the constitution in operation provides insights beyond those available from studying individual well-being. (We show in the robustness section that environmental policy and quality also matter for happiness.) Second, no study has evaluated the relationship between environmental policy measures and any satisfaction variable.
Policies and quality may be related, but there may be important time lags, and citizens' evaluations of the eectiveness of the political system should take into account whether or not the right policies are in place. Third, we use what is, to our knowledge, the largest panel dataset of SWD to date. Fourth, we test for eects that are heterogenous across sub-groups of the population which is something papers using country-level averages cannot do.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses, describes the data, and discusses how our method diers from, and in our judgment improves on, approaches employed in related studies. Section 3 presents the ndings. Section 4 concludes this paper. 2 Hypotheses, data and methodology
We begin by deriving our hypotheses. We then discuss our dependent variable(s), after which we present our key explanatory variables and our controls. Finally, we describe our estimation strategy.
Hypotheses
We test three simple ideas. First, economic theory suggests that collective action problems are never fully resolved. In particular, public goods such as environmental quality will generally be undersupplied, i. e., the collective marginal benets will be greater than the collective marginal costs even when private marginal benets and costs are already equated (Olson 1965) . This results in free-riding and a tendency for environmental degradation (that is, the production of a public bad), among what Olson (1965) termed as latent groups. Most countries fall into this category. 3 Citizens recognize these collective action problems. This implies that individuals on the other hand, stated preference (contingent valuation) methods (Mitchell & Carson 1989; , Portney 1993; Hanemann 1994; Diamond & Hausman 1994) . 3 In Olson's (1965) analysis, group size plays an important role, but virtually all countries are so big that individual benets from environmental quality, net of the costs of contributing to this public good, are most likely to be negative throughout. would prefer better environmental quality than is usually provided. While Olson (1965) proposed some specic mechanisms for how participation can be induced in an otherwise latent group (such as through selective incentives, through repeated interaction, and as by-products of the actions of groups actually created for other purposes), we generally hypothesize that political systems that are more successful at resolving such problems of collective action will command more respect from their citizens. For this result to hold, we need only to assume that individuals regard environmental quality as a good thing. Specically, our rst hypothesis is that higher environmental quality leads to greater satisfaction with the way democracy works.
Citizens may also expect, more concretely, from the`constitution in operation' that it allows the government to provide (at least partially) eective ways towards a resolution of the collective action problem. That is, because citizens recognize that their country is not a unitary actor and may, thus, face a collective action problem, they may perceive it as desirable to have external solutions or at least the setting of boundary conditions for individual actions imposed by the government. Some frictions in the political system are needed to generate an empirical relationship between policy and SWD. To see this, suppose that voters have single-peaked preferences over environmental policy and that environmental policy is determined by politicians to cater to the preferences of citizens (Downs 1957) . In principle, in a perfectly functioning political system, under majority voting, the median voter will thus`set' environmental policy (Black 1948) . There would then exist no relation between policy and SWD (if one assumes that the SWD survey sample is representative enough to bracket the median voter): Each country, at each point in time, is eecting the policy regarded as optimal by the median voter. However, imperfections of the political system may lead to deviations from that optimum. First, elected candidates do not necessarily deliver on their campaign promises. Second, policies are not set continuously, and lobbying activities may lead to both over-provision (if environmental lobbyists are more powerful) or under-provision (if companies favoring laxer environmental standards carry the day); see Grossman & Helpman (2001) . While we do not develop a formal theoretical model in this paper, it seems plausible that on balance the political system would lead to an under-provision of policies that generate positive externalities, compared to what a full resolution of the collective action problem would require. Thus, we also test the idea that environmental policy is generally seen as an important aspect of a well-functioning democracy and will, therefore, also lead to more SWD.
In summation, our two core hypotheses are: Hypothesis 1: More environmental policy is associated with higher SWD.
Hypothesis 2: Better environmental quality is associated with higher SWD.
Third, citizens' preferences over environmental issues may dier not only across countries but also within countries. Many environmental problems inherently are long-term challenges.
A purely selsh individual might simply not care about what happens after he or she dies.
Even rational economic models frequently assume, however, that individuals have a bequest motive, as they think about the welfare of their ospring. Issues of sustainable development and preserving the environment for future generations may, therefore, dierentially aect individuals' perceptions of the way democracy works. If individuals expect environmental problems mainly to concern themselves only in the long run (or even to aect only future generations, not their own) this would suggest that (i) younger citizens and (ii) those with children should care more about environmental policy. Hypothesis 3a: Younger citizens' SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy and quality than the SWD of their older counterparts.
Hypothesis 3b: Parents' SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy and quality than the SWD of non-parents.
Finally, one might argue that the awareness of such complex, long-term problems as the environment, and the awareness of what politics does to address them, might increase with educational attainment. Thus, one could expect a stronger reaction among citizens with more years of formal schooling.
Hypothesis 3c: More highly educated citizens' SWD reacts more strongly to environmental policy and quality than SWD of their lower educated counterparts.
Data
All our data, including the hand-collected items, will be available to other researchers upon publication of this study. Detailed information on all data used can be found in the Data appendix.
Dependent variable
The primary dependent variable for our empirical analysis is a 4-point scale measure of SWD on an individual level from the Eurobarometer survey, based on the question`On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not very satised or not at all satised with the way democracy works in our country? '. The Eurobarometer is a biannual survey launched in 1970 (turning into a quarterly survey in 2000) and includes questions about opinions and basic attitudes regarding the EU and its institutions, politics, economy and society. The question on SWD was rst asked in a core of nine countries in 1973, continued to be asked of respondents from these countries in 1976, and was expanded after 1980, in a stepwise manner, to include respondents from an additional seven countries. We obtain these data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970 File, -2002 . This an integrated set of data covering harmonized variables for the years 1970 through 2002 that allow a cross-time (and cross-country) comparison. The question on SWD was not asked in every survey round in each country since 1973. However, as Table 1 shows, we have information from 313 country-years (covering responses from more than 570, 000 participants). 4
As Figure 1 shows, there is substantial variation across countries in terms of the average level of SWD. Luxembourg exhibits the highest SWD in the whole EU, with a mean of 2.90.
Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria (all values above 2.69) also do very well in terms of satisfying their citizens' expectations of democracy. Ireland, Sweden and Germany are all slightly above the EU average of 2.58 (calculated by averaging country-averages). The larger economies, such as the United Kingdom, France and Spain have values below the average. The country with the lowest levels of satisfaction is Italy, with an average of 1.96.
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here] SWD is a survey measure and, as such, it is, in principle, subject to the same criticisms as any survey. Our line of reasoning in using this dependent variable is pragmatic: SWD has been validated and applied widely (Anderson & Guillory 1997; Linde & Ekman 2003) , and we take its usefulness as a starting point. 5 Note also that, in contrast to contingent valuation approaches, the subjects we study answered the questions about their SWD independently of a specic policy context. Thus, our approach does not require that the respondents be aware of any cause-and-eect relationship. It is not even necessary that respondents know the level of environmental quality. Therefore, our approach is cognitively less demanding than contingent valuation, and whatever relationship we nd cannot be caused by strategic answers.
As an alternative dependent variable, we use overall well-being. This will allow us to contrast our ndings for SWD with the related ndings in this domain. The Eurobarometer includes a question on life satisfaction:`On the whole, are you very satised, fairly satised, not very satised or not at all satised with the life you lead?, and another one on happiness`Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days would you say you're very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy these days? '. Since the number of available observations is substantially larger in the case of the former question (648, 083 versus 134, 607), we use this 4-point scale variable to capture overall well-being, and refer to this variable as life satisfaction (LS) below. Figure 1 indicates that SWD and LS are related, but by no means equivalent. The correlation between the two variables on the individual level is 0.331. On the aggregate level, we see that SWD is typically somewhat lower and more volatile than LS.
Environmental policy
We collect information from dierent sources in order to capture dierent aspects of environmental policy with dierent measures: (i) the existence of a wide array of certain policy measures, (ii) revenues from environmental taxes as a percentage of GDP, (iii) public expenditure on the environment as a percentage of GDP, and (iv) the share of votes for green parties.
Information on the existence of certain policy measures intended to protect the environment are collected from Binder (2002) . These policy measures essentially cover the full spectrum of (2005) for a response to that critique. 6 We read this information from the tables and graphs in Binder (2002) . The full list of the 16 available policy measures is as follows: quota for electricity from renewable energy sources, energy/CO2 tax, packaging rules, sustainability council, subsidy for electricity from renewable energy sources, energy eciency labels, environmental plan, ecolabels, environmental oce, environmental expert council, general environmental act, environmental binary variable is dened that is set equal to one if a country had taken that action in a given
year. For example, the variable energy/CO 2 tax is equal to one when a country had an energy tax in place in a given year and zero otherwise. We then calculate a summary measure, which is simply the number of all policy acts implemented in a given year. It encapsulates the degree to which a country has established a comprehensive set of environmental policies. It is apparent from Figure 2 that there is a tremendous variation in the adoption of such policies across the sample countries. The Netherlands started early and had implemented all 16 policy measures by 1999. In contrast, Belgium was a late adopter and still lags far behind at the end of the sample period.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The data on revenues from environmental taxes and government expenditure on environment protection (both measured as a percentage of GDP) are from the database of Eurostat. The evolution of the adoption of these policy measures in each country also is depicted in Figure 2 .
Unfortunately, these variables are not available for the whole sample period. Information on taxes is missing completely before 1980, and in the case of expenditures, even before 1990.
Notably, the level of government expenditure on environment protection is lower throughout than the revenues from environmental taxes. The revenues from environmental taxes, as a percentage of GDP, are in a range from 1.54% (Spain 1989) to 5.39% (Denmark 1999). Expenditures range between 0.2% (Sweden, 1995−1999) and 1.5% (Luxembourg, 1992 (Luxembourg, −1994 . Of course, the ability of tax revenues (alone) to capture the degree of environmental friendliness may be limited. For instance, low revenues can either be due to little use of environmental taxes, or due to a broad and eective use of such taxes, where high tax rates have altered citizens' behavior. However, when we employ this variable below, we control for other environmental policy measures, allowing us to draw ceteris paribus conclusions.
Finally, we have data on the percentage of total cabinet posts held by green parties (weighted by days) from the Comparative Political Data Set I. This variable serves as a control variable, and we have per se no clear hypothesis on its ceteris paribus eect on SWD. We think of this variable as a good proxy for the degree of environmental awareness, and we will use it as a covariate to check the robustness of our results.
As Table 2 shows, environmental policy and environmental expenditures are (perhaps surprisingly) essentially uncorrelated. Environmental taxes are positively correlated with both the summary policy measure and environmental expenditures. As expected, we see that the larger is the share of green parties in the cabinet, the greater is the number of implemented environmental policy measures and the higher the environmental expenditures.
[Insert Table 2 about here] reporting rules, waste disposal act, environmental protection as a constitutional goal, nature conservancy act, and a soil protection act.
Environmental quality
To measure environmental quality we use data on (i) emissions 7 To control for various determinants of SWD other than environmental factors, we employ a set of (economic) control variables. Better economic performance is most likely associated with higher SWD. As proxies for the overall economic performance we use real GDP per capita, the real GDP growth rate, the ination rate (the annual rate of change in the prices of consumption goods), and the annual budget decit. Moreover, we include openness (exports plus imports divided by real GDP), the total receipts of the government as a percentage of GDP, population size, and an index of the degree of electoral fractionalization of the party-system. 8
Individual-level covariates
It is common in studies of SWD to also include demographic variables. We include a set of socioeconomic control variables capturing: age, sex, family status, education, and labor market status.
Clearly, we would have preferred to control for income, also on the individual level. However, this information is not available for several years and several countries. In any case, education (captured by school leaving age) and labor market status (where we compare employed citizens to unemployed, self-employed, and those out of the labor force) arguably are good proxies for income.
Empirical strategy
Our empirical approach is simple. We run regressions with individual SWD as the dependent variable and our key environmental variables as well as control variables (on an individual and a country level). Specically, due to the nature of the dataset we are able to employ a panel regression, and include country and year xed eects. Since our dependent variable SWD is measured on a four-point scale, we estimate an ordered logit model.
Two aspects of this empirical approach merit comments. First, note that to explore the eect of environmental policy and environmental quality on SWD, we have to deal with data measured on two dierent levels. While we observe SWD on an individual level, we measure environmental policy and environmental quality on a country-level. 9 Moulton (1990) drew economists' atten-8 In particular, we use the index proposed by Rae (1968) that is dened as 1 − n i=1 v 2 i , where vi is the share of votes for party i and n the number of parties. That means, a larger value of this Rae-Index indicates a more fractionalized system. Note that, because all our countries are democracies, controlling for the extent of democracy is not likely to yield added insights. We also included the institutional quality indices found by Wagner et al. (2009) to be correlated with SWD. Whilst this substantially reduces the number of observations, the overall results remain similar and are available on request. 9 In fact, we would prefer individual-level data for environmental policy and environmental quality, but these data do not exist, at least not in a dataset that measures individuals' SWD.
tion to the fact that applying standard estimation methods in this setup can lead to standard errors that are biased downward. Early work tried to meet this challenge by using averaged data. But this ignores heterogeneity on the individual level and assumes homogenous policy eects. Moreover, it reduces the degrees of freedom substantially and requires cardinality of the satisfaction scores. We instead wish to make full use of the information collected at the individual level. Therefore, we follow standard practice and calculate Huber (1967 )-White (1980 standard errors robust to clustering on the country-year level (Froot 1989; Williams 2000) . 10
The second issue we highlight is that of causality. If we observe a statistically signicant coecient on environmental policy in a regression explaining SWD, this does not necessarily mean that environmental policy causes higher SWD. To make a clean causal statement, we would need truly exogenous variation, i. e., random assignment of environmental policies across countries. In fact, however, policy is also endogenous. There are two broad classes of endogeneity concerns: reverse causation and omitted variables. It appears somewhat unlikely that there is reverse causation from SWD to environmental policy. But we cannot completely exclude the possibility that some other omitted (and perhaps unobservable) factors are correlated with both SWD and environmental policy. While this is a concern that is not to be taken lightly, we note that by including many (time-varying) control variables, we ameliorate this concern to a large extent. The longitudinal component of the dataset is also particulary useful in another way:
Since we include xed eects on a country level we control also for all unobserved time-invariant factors. Overall, this control strategy facilitates, though does not completely guarantee, a causal interpretation of our results. 11 3 Estimation results
Our primary results for environmental policy are presented in Table 4 , and those for environmental quality are presented in Table 5 . In order to provide interpretable estimation output, we report besides the coecients (β k ) and the standard errors standardized coecients and changes in the predicted probabilities. Coecients rescaled by their standard deviation (henceforth denoted by σ) enable a simple interpretation just like coecients from a linear regression model. For non-binary explanatory variables we report the fully standardized coecients, given by β S f k = σ k β k /σ SW D * , which can be interpreted as the standard deviation increase in SWD associated with a one standard deviation increase in each of the respective explanatory variable, holding all other variables constant. In the case of binary explanatory variables we report the standardized coecients, given by β S k = β k /σ SW D * , which measures the estimated ceteris paribus standard deviation increase in SWD when the binary explanatory variable switches from zero to one. For the variables of primary interest we report in addition the predicted probabilities of being`not at all satised' (m = 1),`not very satised' (m = 2),`fairly satised' (m = 3) and very satised' (m = 4) due to a discrete change in the respective covariate by half of a standard deviation holding all other covariates at their mean (x), that is, ∆Pr(SWD = m|x)/∆x k .
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Individual and country-level characteristics
We begin by commenting briey on our control variables. Regarding the individual-level characteristics, it is worth noting that we nd very robust eects. That is, the qualitative and quantitative results concerning the demographic covariates are rather similar across all specications. Substantively, we nd that females have a signicantly lower level of SWD. Holding all other covariates constant, specication (I) in Table 4 suggests that their SWD is 0.013 standard deviations less than that of male respondents. 12 With respect to age we nd an inverted U-shaped relationship. Young citizens (i. e., between 15 and 24 years of age, the base group) have a comparably high SWD. Thereafter, we observe a decrease in SWD with rising age. This downward trend, however, reverses for citizens in the more senior age group (i. e., 65 years of age and older). To some extent, this suggests that SWD decreases over the period of working life (when citizens contribute most in terms of taxes). Married citizens are on average more satised (plus 0.053 standard deviations). The coecients of the variables capturing individual economic status by and and large are mainly statistically signicant. As expected, unemployed citizens are compared to employed citizens less satised (minus 0.280 standard deviations). Somewhat surprisingly, self-employed individuals are also comparably less satised with the way democracy works (minus 0.022 standard deviations). It is, for instance, possible that entrepreneurial citizens would on average value more opportunities for political involvement, or entrepreneurial activity per se typically reveals certain shortcomings of the political system. Citizens out of the labor force (i. e., the retired or housewives) do not exhibit a statistically signicant dierent level of SWD compared to employed citizens. Finally, satisfaction rises with education. Compared to the base group of citizens with low educational attainment (i. e., below 16 years of formal education), the SWD of citizens with medium and high levels of educational attainment is greater by 0.034 and 0.086 standard deviations, respectively. The peak level of SWD, however, is achieved by currently enrolled citizens; their SWD is even 0.128 standard deviations larger.
The results for the country-level characteristics are also instructive (see, for instance specication (II) in Table 4 ). Richer, faster-growing, smaller economies and those that run larger decits but have lower government revenue to GDP ratios have higher SWD. Openness and SWD are negatively correlated. Ination enters positively, which may have to do with the fact that in the period under consideration, ination in these countries was relatively moderate and arguably related to economic growth.
Environmental policy
The primary nding of interest in Table 4 is the impact of our summary measure of environmental policy on SWD. The strong and robust result that emerges is that, controlling for a large variety of individual and country-level explanatory variables, a more developed environmental policy is applauded by citizens. The summary measure enters as a statistically signicant determinant of SWD. Specication (II) suggest that an increase in the number of implemented policy measures by one standard deviation (which is equal to 3.78 policies) increases SWD by 0.09 standard deviations (which is equal to 0.075 points). Equivalently, the probability that a citizen is`fairly satised' (`very satised') with the way democracy works is 2.9 (1.3) percentage points higher if the number of implemented policy measures increases by half of a standard deviation. This quantitative eect is comparable to that of real GDP growth. The average marginal eect (not tabulated) of these two variables is about the same: An additional environmental policy measure implemented, or an increase in GDP growth by one percentage point both increase SWD by 0.006 points. Compared to the gender-gap in SWD, an additional environmental policy measure creates an average eect seven times larger than the male-female dierence in SWD.
Notably, the results on the eect of our summary measure of environmental policy on SWD remain unchanged when controlling for the share of green parties in the cabinet, as in specication (III) of Table 4 . This is important because the green parties' percentages of total cabinet posts can be interpreted as time-varying proxies for the degree of environmental awareness. Specication (IV) nally introduces scal activities of the government with respect to environmental policies; note here that the sample size is reduced considerably. Still, even when we control for environmental taxes and expenditures in this smaller sample, the eect of the summary measure of environmental policy is present and signicant (p-value of 0.09). We also tested whether the eect of the summary measure changes over time (i. e., we introduced interaction terms between year xed eects and the summary measure). While we nd that the eect is signicantly dierent in various years, no clear long-run trend is visible. These results are available upon request. 13 In line with the estimated positive eect of our summary measure of environmental policy on SWD, we nd that citizens' SWD increases with public expenditures on the environment. An increase in expenditures by one standard deviation (0.272 percentage points of GDP) is associated with a 0.062 standard deviation increase in SWD. The estimated average marginal eect (i. e., the eect of an increase in expenditures by one percentage point of GDP) is equal to 0.055 points. With respect to environmental taxes we nd a negative eect on SWD. One could have expected that environmental taxes might have a positive eect on SWD due to the potential double dividend they oer in the form of a reduction of negative externalities and a reduction of other distortionary taxes. However, our results do not support this prediction. Instead, citizens seem to nd only government intervention through enhanced spending appropriate, but SWD 13 In untabulated regressions, we have considered`kitchen-sink' models including binary variables for all of the individual policy measures. Only a few individual policy measures are consistently positively or negatively related with SWD; instead, the sign (and signicance) often depends on the introduction of additional controls. The statistical signicance of individual measures may also arise as an artefact of the correlations between the many policy variables included in the horserace. While the summary measure is, by denition, a cruder proxy for environmental policy, the results obtained with it are more stable. is ceteris paribus lower when environmental taxes are higher. Our estimation suggests that an increase in environmental taxes by one standard deviation decreases SWD by 0.073 standard deviations. The average marginal eect is 0.025 points. The positive eects of the summary measure and the public environmental spending, in combination with the negative eect of taxes, are consistent with an economic understanding of environmental problems as collective action problems, i. e., the notion that most individuals care about the environment but few are willing to bear the costs of protecting it. Overall, we interpret our ndings as substantial support for Hypothesis 1 that the adoption of more policy measures increases SWD.
Environmental quality
The second hypothesis that we test is that environmental quality should be positively associated with SWD. Table 5 shows the results for this hypothesis, rst introducing various categories of emissions, then introducing three measures of trac and congestion, and then including all measures (along with the share of green parties in the cabinet). A number of interesting ndings emerge from studying these sets of variables both individually and jointly.
Across all specications we nd negative coecients for sulphur oxide (SO x ), nitrogen oxide With respect to our measures of trac and congestions we nd a positive eect for the carroad ratio, and a robust negative eect for the truck-road ratio. It seems that citizens value their personal mobility (in terms of having a car) quite highly, and even accept a large car-road ratio (i. e., a higher likelihood of congestion). By contrast, they perceive heavy truck trac to be unpleasant and they favor governmental regulations to reduce it. Especially the latter result is plausible, given the signicant amount of public discussion of this topic in some countries.
(See, for example, the transit trac conict between the Austrian government and the EU).
In summary, the results on environmental quality are not as strong as those on environmental policy and provide only weak evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. Citizens may be less informed about environmental quality (captured, for example, by emissions) and/or may hold the domestic political system less responsible for environmental protection within this domain, since they perceive it as a more global phenomenon where national action is less eective.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Life satisfaction
Our equivalent analysis of the eect of environmental policy on LS is summarized in the upper panel of Table 6 , while the results for environmental quality are summarized in the lower panel.
For environmental quality, we obtain, overall, the same patterns as for SWD. As for policy, we can see that the summary measure of environmental policy also has a statistically signicant positive eect on LS. However, this eect is somewhat smaller and less robust than found previously.
In specications (I) through (III) the estimated eect is highly statistically signicant, and suggests that an increase of the summary measure by one standard deviation increases LS by up to 0.079 standard deviations. In specication (IV), where we include environmental taxes and expenditures as additional covariates, however, statistical signicance vanishes and the estimated eect is basically zero. Likewise, we nd a smaller (and less signicant) eect of public environmental expenditures on LS. The average marginal eect is about 0.025. Environmental taxes turn out not to be a signicant determinant of LS. Overall, we interpret these results as evidence that SWD and LS are related but distinct concepts. In our context we nd a stronger relationship between SWD and (environmental) policy measures. This nding seems plausible since SWD refers to the current political situation, while LS is an all-encompassing evaluation of individuals' current life conditions.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Heterogenous eects
To operationalize causal heterogeneity with respect to the impact of environmental measures on SWD, and to test Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, we split the sample along the dimensions of age, parenthood, and educational attainment.
With respect to age, we distinguish between young (below 34 years of age) and old (at least 55 years of age) citizens. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer does not include a specic question on parenthood. However, respondents are asked (in 90 usable country-years)`How many children under 15 are there living at home? '. 14 Given that, in almost all cases, mothers obtain (physical) custody after divorce (or separation) this question can be used to construct valid information on parenthood for women. Therefore, when we refer to parents we distinguish between female parents and female non-parents. To explore the eect among poorly and highly educated citizens we compare estimations based on a sample of citizens with 15 years of formal education or less, and citizens with at least 16 years of formal education. 15 Since we cannot control for income in our full sample, educational attainment incorporates not only the eect of education but (potentially) also the eect of income. Table 7 provides the results. Consider rst the upper panel, where the rst two columns show the eects of environmental measures on SWD for young and old citizens. A comparison of the standardized estimates (and their signicance) indicates that younger citizens care comparably more about environmental policy. For instance, an increase in the summary measure by one standard deviation, increases the SWD of young citizens by 0.070 standard deviations, and those of older citizens by only 0.056 standard deviations. The next two columns dierentiate between 14 To be precise, in a subset of waves the survey dierentiates further between younger (below 8 years of age) and older (above 8 and below 15 years of age) children. 15 The data allow us to consistently distinguish between citizens who are still studying (8.9%), those who have up to 15 years (29.04%), between 16 and 19 years (37.68%) and 20 or more years (24.37%) of formal education. parents and non-parents. While the estimated eect of our summary measure of environmental policy is not statistically signicant (at conventional levels) in either sample, it is remarkable that the estimated coecient is three times larger for parents and has a smaller standard error.
With respect to environmental expenditures we nd that in the case of parents each standard deviation increase in these expenditures increases SWD by 0.105 standard deviations. This eect is highly statistically signicant. The equivalent eect for non-parents is only 0.066 standard deviations. Comparing poorly and highly educated citizens, we nd a comparatively stronger eect of the summary measure in the latter sample (0.092 versus 0.029). 16 We nd similar patterns in an equivalent analysis of LS (not shown).
Overall, we interpret these ndings on heterogenous eects as broadly, though not extremely strongly, supportive for Hypotheses 3a through 3c as far as environmental policy is concerned. By contrast, our analysis of heterogenous eects of environmental quality on SWD (and LS) does not yield important dierences between the sub-groups of citizens under consideration.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Conclusions
This paper investigates satisfaction with democracy in the presence of an especially important and topical collective action problem, the environment. Our rst set of new results shows that, overall, a focus on environmental policy is associated with greater SWD in statistically and economically important ways in our sample of 16 European countries across a period of up to 25 years. Larger public expenditures on the environment tend to increase an average citizen's satisfaction score, while environmental taxes ceteris paribus reduce it. The ndings for environmental quality are more ambivalent. Broadly speaking, parents, young citizens and those with high levels of educational attainment worry signicantly more about appropriate environmental policy than do non-parents, older citizens, and those with fewer years of schooling. These results are intuitive and should be of interest to scholars (including those studying collective action problems other than those problems related to the environment) and policy-makers alike.
Although our paper thus makes progress on the important question of how the environment matters for citizens' SWD, it also has its limitations. Perhaps the primary drawback is that we are not oering a theoretical framework that neatly pins down exactly which variables should play a role in SWD and which should not. This issue is partly addressed by our panel data setup that allows us to control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. But even that approach does not completely exclude the possibility that time-varying omitted variables are driving some of our results. Further theoretical and conceptual work on SWD can, therefore, be fruitfully conducted. 16 If we redene the group of highly educated citizens to comprise those with 20 or more years of formal education (instead of 16 or more years), the eect of the summary measure increases to 0.131.
Data appendix
The information on the individual-level variables satisfaction with democracy, life satisfaction, age, sex, family status, education, labor market status, and children is from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970 . This dataset is prepared by the Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung (Hermann Schmitt and Evi Scholz) and, for instance, available as ICPSR Study No. 4357. We start with all observations for which a measure of satisfaction with democracy is available (see Table 1 ). In our estimation analysis, however, we cannot exploit the full set of observations, since information on some covariates is missing. Information on age enters into the estimations based on binary variables for six age-groups (15 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, and over 65 years) where the youngest group serves as the base group. Family status is captured by a binary variable equal to one if the respondent is married, and zero otherwise.
Educational attainment is incorporated based on binary variables capturing if a respondent is still enrolled in school, has below 15 years of formal education (base group), between 16 and 19 years, or more than 20 years. With respect to labor market status we distinguish between respondents who are employed (base group), self-employed, unemployed and out of the labor force.
The information on the country-level covariates is from dierent sources. First, information on real GDP per capita (in constant prices), the real GDP growth rate (percentage change from previous year), the ination rate (measured as the annual percentage increase in the prices of consumption goods), openness (exports plus imports divided by real GDP per capita; all measured in constant prices), and population size (in thousands) is from the Penn World Tables (version 7.0). Further information is provided by http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/. Second, the information on tax receipts (total tax receipts of government as a percentage of GDP), the annual budget decit (government primary balance) as a percentage of GDP, and the index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system (following Rae 1968), green parties' percentages of total cabinet posts (weighted by days) are from the Comparative Political Data Set I, 1960-2008 provided by Klaus Armingeon, Sarah Engler, Panajotis Potolidis, Marléne Gerber and Philipp Leimgruber; see http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/ comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html.
Our measures of environmental policy are from two dierent sources. First, information on the existence of a quota for electricity from renewable energy sources, an energy/CO 2 tax, a packaging rules, a sustainability council, a subsidy for electricity from renewable energy sources, energy eciency labels, an environmental plan, ecolabels, an environmental oce, an environmental expert council, a general environmental act, environmental reporting rules, a waste disposal act, environmental protection as a constitutional goal, a nature conservancy act, and a soil protection act is collected from Binder (2002) . We obtained the information by reading them from the graphs. The graphs are fortunately of the quality that they allow the unambiguous identication of all cases. Second, data on revenues from environmental taxes and government expenditure on environment protection (both measured as percentages of GDP) are from the database of Eurostat. (Data were retrieved on 2011/04/18.)
Our measures of environmental quality are from two primary sources. Firstly, information on emissions of SO x , NO x , CO, VOC and CO 2 from energy use is collected from the OECD Environmental Data, Compendium 2004. Secondly, the information on the road network (total length of road networks, length of highways) and on the stock of road vehicles (total number of passenger cars in use, total number of other motor vehicles in use) is obtained from the OECD Environmental Data, Compendium 2006 /2007 Applies to estimations in both panels. For denitions of the measures see notes to Table 3 . The Data Appendix provides data sources and further details. Luxembourg has some exceptionally high emissions and is therefore excluded. For the United Kingdom no comparable data on emissions are available.
Fig. 4: Summary of trac variables
a For denitions of the measures see notes to Table 3 . The Data Appendix provides data sources and further details.
